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     ABSTRACT 
 
Based on Helpman et  al. (2004)  we propose  a simple  two-country (Home 
and Foreign)  model with heterogeneous  firms to capture  the role  of FDI  
via  utilizing  time  zone  differences.  Two countries are located in different 
time zones and there is no overlap in daily working hours.   It will be shown 
that productivities of the firms undertaking FDI are higher than the 
productivities of non-FDI f i r m s .  Although the results look quite similar 
with Helpman et al. (2004), the direction of service trade flow is totally 
different:  Foreign subsidiaries of high- productivity firms serve the Home 
market. 
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1 .   Introduction 
 
 
Since 1980s foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown astonishingly 
fast, even faster than international trade. Not only did the overall level of 
FDI increase, it has also been changed from investments in manufacturing 
to investment in services. Related to these, intra-firm trade of business 
services such as engineering, consulting, and software development that do 
not require physical shipments of products, have been playing major roles1.  
 
Following these changes, new types of FDI and service trade surfaced 
in the recent past. Such investment and trade are taking advantage of time 
zone differences between countries emerge. The semiconductor industry 
provides a prime example of this kind of trade. Brown and Linden (2009, pp.  
87–91) wrote: 
 
“Some chip companies with foreign design subsidiaries value the 
opportunity to  design on a 24-hour  cycle because  of the  enormous 
pressure  to  reach  the  market  ahead  of, or no later  than, competitors.  
One established US chip company adopted a rolling cycle between design 
centers in the United States, Europe, and India.   More common is the  bi-
national  arrangement used by a Silicon Valley start-up that  had all of 
its design beyond the initial  specification done by a China  subsidiary  
established  within months  of the  company’s  founding....    The  Silicon 
Valley staff would review Beijing’s work from the  previous day,  then  
spend up to three  hours on the phone (starting  around  5 pm 
                                                          
1
 A substantial amount of empirical research has also emerged very recently revolving around the idea of 
time zones and trade. This further strengthens the underlying encouragement to write this paper. A 
representative sample of empirical papers consists of Anderson (2012), Christen (2012), Costinot et al 
(2012), Dettmer (2011) etc. 
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California time) providing feedback and reviewing assignments  for that  
day in Beijing. In a single-location firm this work-feedback cycle take two 
days instead of one.” 
 
Not only firms, but also consumers also prefer to consume services 
early taking the advantage of time zone differences.  Ireland, pitching to host 
Europe’s main international call centers, offers another example.  Cairncross 
(1997, p.  219) emphasized the rise of the call-center service industry in Ireland, 
which is taking geographical advantage of being in between the U.S. and 
Europe. 
To summarize above arguments: due to the communications 
revolution, time zone differences may become a primary d r i v i n g  force for 
service trade.  Furthermore, these kinds of service trade invite new types of 
incentives for FDI. From home consumers’/firm’s  viewpoints, it is preferable 
that  some subsidiaries  locate  at  distant  areas  to  serve  the Home  market. 
Although this point is at odds with the “proximity advantages” of FDI (e.g., 
Brainard, 1997), it seems to be important to consider these new types of FDI 
incentives. Related to these phenomena, Marjit (2007) examined the role of 
international time zone differences in a vertically integrated Ricardian 
framework.  It has been shown there that time zone differences emerge as an 
independent driving force of international trade besides taste, technology and 
resource endowment.2 
What remains, however, unanswered is the relationship between firm-
productivity and FDI with time zone difference. Based on casual 
                                                          
2
 Jones et al. (2005) also emphasize the role of time zone differences as a determinant 
of efficient worldwide division of labor. Furthermore, fragmentation of production stages 
and of service provision has been studied within a static trade-theoretic framework by Jones 
and Kierzkowski (1990), Grossman and Helpman (2005), Long, Riezman and Soubeyran  
(2005), Do and Long (2008). 
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e m piricism, we believe that time-saving technological improvement (e.g., 
utilization of communications networks such as the Internet) can trigger a 
series of events that leads to reallocations of industry structure via FDI.  In 
the existing literature on FDI and firm heterogeneity, however, relatively few 
attempts have been made to address the role of time zone differences on FDI 
decisions3. This seems to suggest that the focus on “trade using different time 
zones” should be accompanied by a focus on firms’ FDI decisions.  Therefore, 
the main purpose  of this study  is to illustrate,  with simple FDI model with 
heterogeneous firms, how a time-saving  improvement  in service trade  using 
different  time  zones can have a huge impact  on firms’ FDI decisions. 
For these purposes, based on Helpman et al. (2004), we propose a 
simple two-country model with heterogeneous firms that capture the role of 
FDI via utilizing time zone differences.  Two countries  (Home and  Foreign)  
are assumed  to  be located  in different  time  zones and  there  is no 
overlap  in daily  working hours. We further assume that both countries are 
small in nature. The  key assumption  of our  model is that  domestic service 
production  requires two consecutive workdays  and  that  products  are  
ready  for sale after  two workdays- domestic  delivery  bears  significant  costs 
in terms of delay4. In contrast to this, the utilization of communications 
networks allows production in a foreign country with non-overlapping work 
hours, and service trade via networks enable a quick delivery and low 
shipping costs. In other words, imported services, whose production benefits 
                                                          
3 In a n  important contribution, Helpman et. al.  (2004) show that the productivity of the 
firms undertaking FDI is higher than the productivity of the exporters. Following this, 
Mukherjee (2010) shows that the theoretical prediction of Helpman et al. (2004) may not 
hold. In addition, Helpman (2006) provided an excellent survey on the literature on FDI 
with heterogeneous firms. 
 
4
 For related issues and modelling of such cost in time zones and trade context see Marjit (2007), 
Kikuchi et. al. (2013), Mandal et. al. (2014). 
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from time zone differences, provide higher value than domestically produced 
service. 
Based on the model outlined  above,  this  study  shows t h a t  
productivity of the firms undertaking FDI is higher  than  the  productivities 
of non-FDI firms.  Although the results look quite similar with Helpman et. al.  
(2004), the direction of service trade flow is totally different:  foreign 
subsidiaries of high-productivity firms serve the Home market. In other 
words, in the sense of timeliness, building Foreign subsidiaries via FDI 
implies building subsidiaries closer to the Home market (see, Figure 1).This 
result is in contradiction with the conventional wisdom that asserts 
why foreign subsidiaries of high productive domestic firms via FDI 
serve the Foreign market. Whereas, in this paper, we primarily focus 
on how productivity of firms determines location of their production 
for serving their domestic market. 
 
 
2 .   The Model and Basic Results 
 
 
Suppose there are two countries, Home and Foreign, which are endowed 
with one factor of production (labor). They are located in different time zones 
and there is no overlap in daily working hours: when Home’s daytime 
working hours end, Foreign’s daytime working hours begin (Figure  1). 
There are two types of goods: a homogeneous good and a large variety 
of differentiated services. Only Home consumers demand the differentiated 
services, while both countries demand the homogeneous good. 
The preference of the representative Home consumer are given by 
 
 = 1 −  log  +          (1) 
 
Where z is t h e  consumption of the homogeneous good, x(v) is t h e  
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consumption  of variety  v,   =  ,  > 1 is the elasticity  of substitution 
between varieties.  Thus we have the following demand function for x: 
 
 = "#           (2) 
 
" = $% &'()*+,         (3) 
 
where E  is the  aggregate  level of spending  in Home, n  is the  
measure  of service varieties available in Home, and p(v) is the consumer’s 
price of variety v. 
The homogeneous good is produced with constant returns, using labor 
as input.   Units are chosen in such a way that one unit of labor produces one 
unit of output. As usual, no transport costs exist for the homogeneous good, 
which serves to tie down the wage rate.   Also assume that the parameters of 
the model are such that both countries produce the homogeneous good. Thus, 
wages (hereafter set to unity) across countries are identical and constant. 
Now let us turn to the differentiated services.  To simplify the analysis, 
we assume that the difference in productivities of firms exists only for Home firms. 
To enter the industry, a firm bears the fixed costs of entry -% , measured in 
labor units. An entrant then draws a labor-per-unit-output coefficient a 
from a distribution G(a). Upon observing this draw, a firm may decide to exit 
and not to produce. If it chooses to produce domestically, however, it bears 
additional fixed overhead labor costs  -. . On the other hand, if it chooses to 
serve the domestic (Home) market via foreign direct investment (FDI), it 
bears additional fixed costs -/ (e.g., build up communications networks  
between  two countries).  We assume 
 -/ > -..                                                         (4)  
The key assumption is that domestic production requires two workdays 
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and that service is ready for sale after two workdays - the delivery of 
domestic product or service involves significant costs in terms of delay.  In 
contrast to this, utilization of communications networks allows part-
production in Foreign country with non-overlapping work hours, and trade 
via networks/Internet enables quick delivery.   For these reasons, imported 
service products, whose production benefit from time zone differences provide 
higher value than domestically produced services. 
In order to capture this point, we assume that shipment of products 
incurs the “iceberg” effect of delivery costs: to sell one unit of Foreign 
products in the Home market,  0 0 > 1 units  must  be  shipped. Thus, the 
price of t h e  Foreign services becomes 0 times higher than its original price.  
One can interpret 0 as a measure of the inverse of the “delivery timeliness” 
of Foreign products in the Home market:  a lower value of τ implies a quicker 
delivery. 
As mentioned above,  domestic  production  are  ready  for sale after  two 
workdays, whereas imported  services whose production  benefits  from time 
zone differences are available sooner (see Figure 1). To parameterize the 
timing of delivery, we treat the utilization of communications networks (i.e., 
technological improvement) as a reduction in the delivery time of imported 
products (i.e., a decrease in 0 )5.  Let us denote the Foreign services’ delivery 
timeliness before technological change as 0  and that after change as 02. 0 
represents the cost of communication which is required when TZ difference is 
exploited. Then the following condition holds: 
 
                                                          
5 0 depends only on ICT. ICT revolution reduces 0 and opens up the possibility of utilizing TZ 
difference. 
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0 > 02 ≥ 1                                                     (5)6 
 
 
Note that this effect comes not from lower production  costs in Foreign, 
but from faster delivery.  In other words, in a sense of timeliness, building 
Foreign subsidiaries via FDI implies building subsidiaries closer to the Home 
market (see, Figure 1). 
As noted above,  preferences  (1)  generate  a demand  function  "# for 
every brand  of the service products,  where the demand  level A is exogenous 
from the point of view of the individual supplier.  In this case, the brand of a 
monopolistic producer with labor coefficient a offers the price # = 45  where 
6 > 1 represents the loss of valuation from consumer’s perspective due to 
untimely delivery and 1/α represents the markup factor. So essentially producers 
get a price equal to 
&
4 < #. 6 gradually falls if consumers get the product early. 
This is a natural preference behavior of the consumers. As a result,  the effective 
consumer  price is 
45
  for domestically  produced  services, and  is 
895   for 
imported  services. 
Operating profits from domestic production for a firm with a labor-
output coefficient : is 
;. = :< − -.        (6) 
< = ='()           (7) 
On the other hand, the operating profit from FDI (serving Home 
market via communication network) is 
;/> = 0>:< − -/ ,        ? = 1, 2              (8)
     
 These profit functions are depicted in Figure 2. In this figure, :  is 
                                                          
6
 In one extreme 02 = 1 indicating zero communication cost. 
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represented on the horizontal axis.  Since  > 1, this variable increases 
monotonically with labor productivity 1/a, and can be used as a 
productivity index. Two profit functions are increasing linear functions of 
this index.  More productive firms are therefore more profitable in all these  
two activities. 
The least productive firms expect negative operating profits and 
therefore exit the industry. This happens to all firms with productivity 
levels below :. . The slope of ;  equals0><, i = 1, 2, which depends 
on the technological condition of communication network (see (5)).  
When 0 > 6 > 1, FDI is always unprofitable (a dotted l ine).  If 0 > 6 >
02 > 1, firms with productivity  above :/  gain more from FDI7.  For 
this reason, given that 1 < 02 < 6, firms with productivity levels between 
:.and :/ choose domestic production while those with higher 
levels build subsidiaries in Foreign and produce Foreign services.  In other 
words, via time-saving technological improvement, firms with higher 
productivity begin to build Foreign subsidiaries. The (fixed) costs of building 
Foreign subsidiaries can be offset by a lower delivery (time) costs of services 
denoted by 6. 
 
 
Proposition 1:  Given that 1 < 02 < 6 < 0 , firms with higher productivity   
choose to FDI and provide “ Foreign” services for Home market.             ∎         
  
It is evident from the figure that the cutoff coefficients are determined 
by 
6:.< = -.         (9) 
02 − 6:/< = -/ − -.       (10) 
                                                          
7 0 :C02 are the cost of communication in pre and post technological revolution phase, 
respectively with the condition that 02 < 0. 
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Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating profits of 
a potential  entrant and the entry  costs -%  . This condition can be expressed 
as 
D02 − 6E:/ + E:.F< − G:/-/ − -. + G:.-. = -%      (11) 
      E: =  H5I GH                   (12) 
Equations (9) − (11) provide implicit solutions for the cutoff coefficients :. , 
:/, and the demand level B 
Combining (9) and (10), the following must be hold: 
5J5K = 02 LKLJLJ   4
'()
8M'()4'()
/
                   (13) 
 From (13), we can obtain  the  ratio  of domestic production  relative  to 
FDI sales: 
OJOK = 
45'()$PJPK 8M5'()PK, =  48M
 QR5JR5K − 1S      (14) 
 
In order to explore the effects of productivity dispersion on the ratio 
OJOK , we parametarize V(a) by parametarizing the distribution G(a).  For 
expositional purposes, let us use a Pareto d i s t r i b u t i o n  with the shape 
parameter k.8  Then, we can obtain 
E: =  H5I GH = T:U       (15) 
where c is constant and it is assumed that  V >  − 1 Plugging back in 
(14), we can obtain 
OJOK =  48M
 WXLKLJLJ   4
'()
8M'()4'()Y
Z()(')(' − 1[     (16) 
 
                                                          
8
 See, for example,  Helpman  et al. (2003, 2004) 
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It is then straightforward to see that the ratio of domestic production to 
FDI is decreasing in delivery timeliness of imported services as 6 is assumed to 
be a constant because people’s valuation for waiting time does not change very 
quickly. It i s  also decreasing in productivity dispersion, as parametrized by 
lower k. 
 
Proposition 2:  A  decrease in  one country’s  delivery costs  for imported 
services decreases the relative sales of domestic production.  Also, an increase 
in productivity dispersion decreases the relative share of domestic production. 
 
Let us suppose that   Home is a developed country, while Foreign is a 
developing country. Our  result  suggests  that   a  time-saving  technological 
change  improvement in  the  developed  country,  which  then  requires  
more services provided  with  the  benefit  of time  zone differences, triggers  
high- productivity firms’ FDI  toward  the  developing country.   Jones and  
Marjit (2001) argue that,  in a world in which the  costs of service links are 
falling drastically,  fragmentation of production  process offers new 
opportunities to developing countries.  The present result i n FDI with 
high-productivity firms provides some theoretical grounds for such a 
development process. 
 
3.   Conclusions 
 In line with Helpman et al (2004) here we have developed a two country 
model to check if productivity determines the trade pattern in presence of on-
overlapping time-zones between trading countries. It has been shown here that, 
even in absence of any wage differential, a fall in communication cost itself may 
trigger trade in finished and unfinished services. The pattern of trade we 
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describe is different from what is explained in the existing literature. In the 
same line we also explain why high productive firms opt for FDI in trading 
countries and import back the finished product. This argument does not 
naturally go with the traditional arguments for FDI and trade pattern where 
foreign subsidiaries serve the foreign market. Therefore, introduction of non-
overlapping time zones with low communication cost adds an interesting 
dimension to the FDI and trade pattern literature. Our results would be 
strengthened further if one introduces wage differential as predicted in Jones 
and Marjit (2001). 
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